Judy Bethwaite, Victoria University of Wellington – 12/2/98
More in an occasional series about an economist’s approach to life and the universe!
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| Judy Bethwaite | 
 When it was announced in 1990 that the family benefit was to be  scrapped,
 an off-the-cuff comment by Prime Minister David Lange seemed to  attract
 rather more attention than the policy change itself.  In defending the  decision to axe the universal benefit in order to target welfare  assistance
 on low income families, Lange said “I don’t need the family benefit”.  To
 which women up and down the country replied “You  don’t get the  family benefit, your wife   does”.  
 Until very recently, economists haven’t had the analytical tools to  understand the implications of what women have known all along:  the  person
 who controls the income, has a large say in how it is spent. 
 Economists typically view the family as a “black box” Instead, economists have typically assumed that all household income  is
 pooled;  and as a consequence,  family expenditure is assumed to  depend on
 total family income, rather than on the incomes of individual family  members.  
 Of course if total family income is  the only thing that  determines
 family expenditure patterns, then Lange’s statement about the family  benefit would not have aroused the ire of women up and down the  country.
 Furthermore, there would be no issue for policy makers regarding the  targeting of income-assistance on individual family members.  It  simply
 would not matter which household member received family benefit or  family
 support payments.  Economists who persist in viewing the family as a  “black
 box”, with income flowing in and demands for goods and services  flowing
out, cannot deal with these issues.
 Spending patterns reflect the control of finances within the  family The challenge facing economists interested in the economics of the  family,
 is to develop new ways of thinking about families which reflect the  knowledge that family expenditure decisions are derived from the  divergent
 interests of husbands and wives.  Economists must respond to the  evidence
 from a number of studies, which show that income controlled by the  husband
 and wife have significant and often substantially different effects on  family behaviour, whether measured by expenditures on different kinds  of
 goods and services, or by outcomes such as child health.  The most  provocative studies have come from Ghana and Brazil where it has been  found
 that children, especially daughters, are taller when their mothers  control
a larger proportion of family resources. 
 New Zealand research Qualitative research by Robin Fleming and Susan Easting on a sample of  New
 Zealand women suggests that women’s expenditure on their own dental  care is
 correlated with their degree of control over family income. Many women  from
 supposedly “well off” families were unable to “afford” a visit to the  dentist.
 A “natural experiment” One way of testing whether it really is true that who holds the purse  strings controls how the money is spent, is to look at what happens  when
 income is transferred from husbands to wives (or vice versa).   Such a  “natural experiment” occurred in Britain in the late 1970s.  The  universal
 child allowance, which had consisted primarily of a reduction in the  taxes
 withheld from a father’s pay, was replaced by a cash benefit to the  mother.
 Researchers noted a shift towards relatively greater expenditure on  women’s and children’s goods coinciding with the policy change –  strong
 evidence against the notion that total household income is the only  determinant of family expenditure.
 Benefits can be targeted effectively Rejecting the old idea has important policy implications.  Policy  makers
 have often wanted to target benefits to particular people within  families.
 Economists, blinkered by their belief that only total income matters,  have
 argued that targeting benefits on particular family members  is  ineffective. New work suggests that targeting benefits can  affect
 the distribution of expenditure within families, and information about  how
 they do so can be used in the optimal design of family support  programmes.
 There may also be other implications of economists peeking into the  “black
 box” of the family.  Economists interested in the economics of the  family
 in the United States have long sought an explanation for why many  fathers
 do not pay alimony on divorce.  In New Zealand, the law relating to  the
 equal division of property on marriage dissolution, may also influence  the
 welfare of children, particularly if they are in the care of one  parent.
